

VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #1125/01 3441504
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101504Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0546
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5685
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2864
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1874
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7081

S E C R E T GENEVA 001125

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP

NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01110 (SFO-GVA-VII-050)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-059.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 27, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the November 27 meeting of the Conversion or Elimination (Core) Working Group, the two sides agreed on wording to resolve differences in Sections VI and VII of the Core Part of the Protocol. They also resolved one bracketed issue in Section I and some bracketed wording in treaty Article VII. A difficult discussion on mobile launcher elimination and missile elimination ensued. Col Ryzhkov proposed tagging mobile launchers upon elimination and allowing inspectors to check the tags following completion of elimination. However, Ryzhkov did not agree to Mr. Elliott's requirement that such tags must either be impossible to remove or else be placed on all mobile launchers from the beginning until the elimination inspection. Ryzhkov instead withdrew the proposal.

[1](#)4. (S) The Russian side offered no substantive change to its

previous proposals for liquid-fueled and solid-propellant ICBM and SLBM elimination, as well as requiring elimination of both launch canisters and loading tubes. Elliott made clear that merely burning a solid rocket motor was not sufficient to consider an SS-25 ICBM eliminated, but suggested the possibility of putting two holes through the side of the motor case, which inspectors would later confirm. Ryzhkov did not reject the idea out-right, but railed against persistent U.S. efforts to retain excessive START verification measures that were inappropriate for the two countries' current relationship. End Summary.

15. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Back To Conforming; Touching Up General Provisions; Playing Tag With Mobile Launchers; Missile Elimination Technology Lesson; The Daily Sermon on Verification.

BACK TO CONFORMING

16. (S) The seventh meeting of the CorE Working Group during Session VII was held at the Russian Mission on Friday, November 27, 2009. The two sides first discussed Section V on Procedures for CorE of Heavy Bombers, which the U.S. side had returned from conforming. Mr. Elliott informed Col Ryzhkov, who did not have a copy of the latest U.S. draft, that the U.S. side considered it necessary to add a statement to the last paragraph clarifying that "The Party receiving such notification shall have the right to inspect the converted heavy bomber within a 30-day period beginning on the date of notification." Elliott then provided a copy of

the latest U.S. draft, dated November 24, 2009. Ryzhkov noted that the Russian delegation had worked off of an earlier, shorter version of the paragraph. They would consider the new U.S. wording, and if they found it acceptable, they would send Section V back to the Conforming Group.

17. (S) Similarly, the U.S. side had determined that Section VII on Procedures for Elimination of Facilities was not yet ready to be conformed. The U.S. version included ICBM emplacement equipment in the list of items to be removed from a facility, but the Russian version still did not include it, even though Ryzhkov had agreed at the last meeting to accept inclusion if the United States wanted (Reftel). Ryzhkov tried to persuade the U.S. side that there was no need to include ICBM emplacement equipment on the list. Russia saw no reason for concern about ICBM emplacement equipment located at a facility where all silos had been eliminated. There would be no launchers for such equipment to load missiles into any more. Russia preferred not to undertake an obligation to spend the money to remove unusable ICBM emplacement equipment from eliminated silo ICBM bases. Elliott offered to consult with the U.S. delegation further about it.

18. (S) Regarding another item on the list, Ryzhkov said Russia had changed its terminology from "launch-associated support vehicle" to "launch-associated vehicle," because Russia's approach did not include the concept of support equipment. Ryzhkov confirmed that the term still would refer to vehicles that supported launches of ICBMs from mobile launchers. Elliott acknowledged it was not a major difference. For the word preceding the list, Elliott recommended changing "including" to "and," so that it would not appear as if the items of support equipment listed thereafter were strategic offensive arms (SOA). Ryzhkov had no objection.

19. (S) Ryzhkov raised a difference between the Russian and U.S. wording in paragraph 2 of Section VII, on Elimination of Fixed Structures. Russia omitted the word "other," saying simply that "No structure or covering, permanent or temporary, shall be reinstalled or built over the remaining foundation." Elliott agreed there was no need to state "no

other structure."

¶10. (S) Elliott next raised some tracking fixes that needed to be made in Section VI, which had been conformed earlier. The Conforming Group had decided that the phrase "limitations provided for in the Treaty" should be changed to "provisions of the Treaty." Ryzhkov then noted that the Conforming Group also disapproved of the section title "Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability" because things like accidental loss were not procedures. Russia proposed changing the title to "Other Means for Removal from Accountability." Elliott agreed, and Ryzhkov promised to return Section VI to the Conforming Group.

TOUCHING UP GENERAL PROVISIONS

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov then turned to Section I, General

Provisions, providing a new Russian-proposed joint draft text dated November 27. The sides recognized that references in the text to sections and parts of the Protocol needed to be updated in accordance with the new agreed structure of the Protocol. Ryzhkov noted that Russia had shortened its paragraph 6 of Section I, to simply refer to Article IX of the treaty instead of spelling out observation by national technical means (NTM).

¶12. (S) Elliott related that he had discussed paragraph 4 with Dr. Warner, and decided that the U.S. side was ready to accept Russia's wording for what would take place within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) - "a demonstration of the procedures that it developed." The chairs of the Inspection Protocol Working Group did not consider it necessary to develop any treaty provisions for such activities; the two Parties would instead work them out in the BCC. Ryzhkov agreed and noted Mr. Smirnov had been trying to convince Warner and Col Ilin of the same thing.

¶13. (S) Elliott predicted that the brackets in paragraph 3 on the status of items following conversion would be resolved by the Agreed Statements on B-1B Heavy Bombers and U.S. SSGNs that the U.S. side was drafting. Ryzhkov therefore decided not to discuss Section I further.

¶14. (S) Ryzhkov raised the fact that, in paragraph 1 of Article VII of the treaty, Russia used the term "removal from accountability by other means" while the U.S. text had "other removal from accountability." Elliott said he agreed with Russia's wording, but would need to consult with the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group. Ryzhkov went on to explain that the word "procedures" later in the paragraph was inconsistent with what he and Elliott had just agreed regarding other means for removal from accountability, so Russia proposed deleting the word "procedures." The sentence would simply say "in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol." Mr. Ivanov suggested that Article VII could now be sent to the Conforming Group.

PLAYING TAG WITH MOBILE LAUNCHERS

¶15. (S) Ryzhkov next raised mobile launcher elimination. He proposed that, upon completion of elimination procedures, a tag with a unique identification number would be attached to the mobile launcher. Russia could use tags similar to those used currently under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program for components undergoing elimination. In this case, the tags could be metal instead of plastic, to make them more difficult to remove. Ryzhkov suggested that the United States could produce the special tags and the special device to attach them, and Russia would attach the tags after completing elimination of a launcher. Russia would provide the unique identification number when notifying the completion of elimination, and inspectors could confirm the

number on the tag during an inspection. Russia believed this would ensure confidence that the launcher was really eliminated.

¶16. (S) Elliott asked how such tags were currently used, and Mr. Smirnov suggested Elliott ask Raytheon's Moscow office to

send photographs and documentation by FAX or e-mail. Smirnov explained that the tags were affixed to items before moving them from one facility to another. Upon their arrival at the CorE facility, the tags were checked to ensure the item was the same. The tag could not be removed except by cutting it off. Elliott noted the idea had merit, but for it to be a reliable verification tool, all mobile launchers would have to be tagged from the beginning. After confirmation of the completion of elimination, the tag could be removed.

¶17. (S) Both Smirnov and Ryzhkov objected strenuously. They said Russia could not accept attaching unique identifiers (UID) to all mobile launchers. Elliott noted that the United States was offering to put UID on all U.S. missiles as well as Russian missiles. Ryzhkov insisted it was necessary to think of some other option besides UID. Elliott offered that any marking put on a launcher that was impossible to remove would work.

¶18. (S) Ryzhkov launched into a diatribe on the absurdity of the apparent U.S. suspicion that Russia would restore its obsolete mobile launchers to build up a covert force. If Russia wanted to construct mobile launchers covertly, it could do so at the Volgograd Barrikady plant, which was not monitored. Moreover, many types of missiles had been eliminated without any verification, and neither Party raised questions about cheating. Smirnov argued that Russia's proposed set of verification measures should be sufficient; a mobile launcher would be displayed to NTM at a viewing site for 60 days following elimination, and a tag would be applied, and the launcher could be subject to an inspection. Smirnov also argued that the B-1B problem was very similar, until Russia could confirm that the bombers did not have nuclear capability, Russia would consider them accountable as nuclear-equipped heavy bombers.

¶19. (S) Elliott pointed out that, in the ratification process, the treaty provisions would be examined to determine whether elimination of each mobile launcher could be reliably verified. If the tag could be removed, verification experts would say it could not be proven that a specific launcher was eliminated, since they all looked the same. This problem did not exist for silo elimination or submarine elimination. If Russia could offer an approach that would confirm each specific launcher was eliminated, such as a serial number or non-removable tag, then it might be possible to confirm elimination with an inspection after the fact and Russia might not have to remove the aft 0.78 meters of the chassis. Then it would be easier for Russia to use the chassis for other purposes.

¶20. (S) Ryzhkov claimed not to understand what difference it made which specific launcher was eliminated. He found many U.S. concerns far-fetched. Russia believed that providing for NTM observation and for the possibility of an inspection after the fact ensured verifiability. Elliott said he was not accusing Russia of wanting to hide launchers, but people reviewing the treaty would say it was not possible to be certain that an eliminated launcher being shown was not the same launcher that was eliminated a year ago. Such analyses were particularly likely when the Senate would review the treaty for advice and consent to ratification.

¶21. (S) At that point, Ryzhkov declared there was nothing more to say. He withdrew the proposal to tag eliminated mobile launchers since it had raised more questions than it had answered.

¶22. (S) Nevertheless, during a break, Ryzhkov approached

Elliott to inform him that Russian serial numbers were on metal plates that could be removed from the chassis and replaced, so serial numbers were not a solution. However, Russia believed notifications would be sufficient, along with random inspections as a confidence-building measure. He continued to argue that it was wrong to assume cheating. Russia would reciprocate such suspicion and would say that any U.S. tags or UID could be moved from one missile to another.

MISSILE ELIMINATION TECHNOLOGY LESSON

¶23. (S) Ryzhkov provided a new Russia-proposed text for Section II on procedures for elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, dated November 25, 2009. He outlined that paragraph 1 covered procedures for elimination of liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, paragraphs 2 and 3 covered procedures for elimination of solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, and paragraph 4 covered elimination of launch canisters and SLBM loading tubes.

¶24. (S) Ryzhkov explained that Russia maintained its previous position on liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. They must be rendered inoperable by procedures determined by the possessing Party, because the oxidizer of these missiles was highly toxic, while the fuel was ten times more toxic. The elimination procedures involved cutting off all the fuel lines and neutralizing both the fuel and oxidizer. In addition, at Surovatikha the engine was destroyed by completely cutting up the fuel and oxidizer tanks. Other valves and joints were also removed so that a special flange could be inserted for fuel neutralization. The workers wore special chemical suits, because it was very dangerous if any fuel or oxidizer remnants were present. The process was very different from that for solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, and there was no need for verification.

¶25. (S) Regarding solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, Russia provided for three elimination procedures:

- removing propellant from all stages by burning. This in itself would complete the elimination of the missile;
- removing propellant from all stages by another means followed by cutting the motor case of the first stage into two pieces; and
- other procedures developed by the Party carrying out the elimination. This could include elimination by explosion, which Ryzhkov understood the United States planned to do.

¶26. (S) Following elimination of solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, they would be displayed for NTM for 30 days, which Russia understood the United States wanted to be 60 days. Launch canisters and loading tubes would be separated into

two pieces and displayed for NTM for 60 days. However, Russia would be willing to delete entirely the provisions on launch canister and loading tube elimination. Elliott made clear the United States would not accept that loading tubes were equivalent to launch canisters.

¶27. (S) Elliott indicated his understanding, which Ryzhkov and Smirnov confirmed, that Russia currently burned solid-propellant ICBM motors at Perm' and then moved them back to Votkinsk for cutting. He was trying to think of ways for Russia to avoid having to move the empty motor cases. Russian motor cases were very strong and did not always burn through or even deform. They were stronger than U.S. ICBM motor cases. Ryzhkov seemed surprised and said he thought U.S. motor cases were stronger. Zaitsev asserted that U.S. and Russian motor cases were made of the same material, but might have different coefficients of strength and different thicknesses. The important point in Zaitsev's view was that, once a motor was burned it could not be used again.

¶28. (S) Elliott asked whether it would be possible to use a torch to cut holes in the side of the motor case if it was not already burned through when the fuel was removed by burning. Inspectors could then confirm on-site that the motor cases had been destroyed. If the fuel went bad and a missile needed to be blown up, would that also be done at Perm'? Ryzhkov responded that explosions could not be done at Perm' because it was a large city. Russia would conduct explosions, if needed, at the Telemba Test Range, which did not exist yet but would be declared as a new facility. (Begin comment: According to the Russian press, Telemba is a firing range in the Chita Oblast. End comment.)

¶29. (S) Ryzhkov asked sardonically what kinds and sizes of holes would have to be specified in the treaty text. Elliott estimated that each hole should be 10cm in diameter. Ryzhkov said a torch could not be used to cut holes in motor cases. Smirnov drew a schematic of a solid rocket motor to indicate that during a burn without nozzle attached, the plume was uncontrolled and the aft edge of the casing was burned 90 percent of the time, reducing the case length slightly. There was no possibility of reusing a burned motor case. Smirnov began to object to the prospect of having to bring U.S. inspectors to the burn site to inspect holes in motor cases, but Ryzhkov quieted him, saying he would have to consult with his delegation regarding the proposal to put holes in the motor cases. Elliott suggested that inspections of burned motor cases with holes drilled into them could be done on a batch basis, such as three or four times a year. It might be possible to limit the number of elimination inspections conducted.

THE DAILY SERMON ON VERIFICATION

¶30. (S) Ryzhkov stonily insisted that the only on-site verification of eliminations should be Type 2 inspections within the annual quota for that type of inspection. That was the guidance from Russia's leadership--the Russian President had directed that there be only 16 inspections per year, including elimination inspections. In general, Russia believed there was no need to monitor the elimination of SOA,

but each Party should have the right to confirm that the other was not cheating. The quota was small, but each Party could use it as desired. It would provide confidence that the treaty was being implemented fully. Russia was trying to do away with burdensome verification measures, but the United States kept pulling Russia back toward the START regime. This was fundamentally objectionable to Russia. No other treaty was as burdensome as START. It was wrong to retain such a regime, especially given the current state of U.S.-Russian relations.

¶31. (S) Returning to the topic, Ryzhkov acknowledged that NTM could not verify the status of a solid rocket motor, but he found the idea of holes far-fetched. Ukraine had agreed to drill holes in its SS-24 rocket motor cases, but those cases were washed out, not burned. Elliott indicated his understanding of Russia's position, but pointed out that many in the United States, including some in the Senate, believed that an appropriate verification regime was a prerequisite for having a treaty. The verification regime did not need to be as intrusive as START, but if it was inadequate, it would not be possible to convince the Senate to provide advice and consent to ratification.

¶32. (S) Ryzhkov then provided a new Russian-proposed JDT for Section IV on Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers, dated November 25, 2009. As he did so, he stated his view that fewer implementation obligations were better for both countries. Russia strongly opposed intrusiveness, not because it planned to cheat, but because it was not necessary given the current level of relations. The United States and Russia instead needed to conduct joint

programs and joint training. The treaty was needed more as an example for other countries than for the United States and Russia themselves. The United States and Russia needed more flexibility, fewer expenses and fewer limitations. The new treaty should be not just 30 percent easier but 90 percent easier.

¶33. (S) When Elliott proposed meeting on Sunday (November 29), Ryzhkov put his foot down, saying he saw no possibility to move forward at this time. It would be like trying to grind water--a pointless exercise. It would make sense to meet again only after new decisions were made. Ryzhkov thought that would happen on Monday (November 30).

¶34. (S) Smirnov asked whether the procedures the United States proposed for solid-propellant ICBMs would apply as well to Peacekeeper and MM-II ICBMs. Elliott confirmed they would apply in the same way, but acknowledged the United States would utilize most of its ICBMs for space launch. Ryzhkov sniffed that the United States was then drafting proposals solely for Russia. Elliott countered that the United States would in fact eliminate some missiles, including many SLBMs, which were eliminated by explosion. The United States would be required to use the same elimination procedures as Russia. In addition, Russia was also free to use its missiles for space launch.

¶35. (U) Documents provided:

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed JDT, Section V of Part III of Protocol: Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers, dated November 24, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Russian-Proposed JDT, Chapeau and Section C.I of Protocol: General Provisions, dated November 25, 2009;

-- Russian-Proposed Text, Section C.II of Protocol: Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, dated November 25, 2009; and

-- Russian-Proposed JDT, Section C.IV of Protocol: Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of SLBM Launchers, dated November 25, 2009.

¶36. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Broshar
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Voloskov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶37. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS